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Abstract: In sociology, modernisation is often identified with secularisation. How can secularisation
in the texts of modernism around 1900 be analysed? Literary history books tell us that the modernist
authors were lucid analysts of their time who portrayed the process of secularisation going on
around them in their dramas, novels or short stories. The article tries out a different approach:
By conceptualizing secularisation as a cultural narrative, the perspective on the literary material
changes fundamentally. The modernist authors were involved in shaping the idea of secularisation
in the first place, in propagating it and in working on its implementation. They did not react to the
process of secularisation with their texts. Instead, they were involved in the creation and shaping of
the interpretative category ‘secularisation’. The article exemplifies this change in approach using
a pivotal text of Nordic literary modernism, Ibsen’s Rosmersholm.
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1. What Kind of Modernity?
One of the generally accepted notions of the Scandinavian classification of period is that modernity
was introduced to Danish, Norwegian, and Swedish literature when Georg Brandes gave his first
lecture in his series on 19th century European literature at the University of Copenhagen in 1871:
Brandes propagated a decidedly modern literature which drew its modernity from responding to the
pushes for modernisation that fundamentally changed European societies in the second half of the 19th
century; he registered how industrialisation and modern monetary economics were putting mental
frameworks in motion, how social boundaries were opening up, how women were breaking out of
traditional roles, how Christianity was losing its status. Therefore, he called for a literary awareness
that covers these four important issues: the unjust distribution of property, the social stratification,
the relationship between the sexes, and the social role of religion.
The conception of modernity that nowadays informs this perception of Brandes (and the literature
of the Modern Breakthrough) is based on a model of modernisation that originates from sociology
(Van der Loo and van Reijen 1997): A modern society is characterised by freedom and individualism,
by the participation of broad sections of society in the political decision-making process, by rationality
and the facilitation of life due to the mechanisation of all areas of life. Yet, even the founding fathers of
sociology, namely Émile Durkheim, Ferdinand Tönnies, Georg Simmel, and Max Weber, are aware of
the paradox consequences and the strangely ambivalent state of mind this positively connoted process
generates: Thus, the increasing domination of nature, for instance, opens up previously unimagined
liberties, but the downside of power gained is the responsibility for the consequences which overwhelm
modern man. The domination of nature by man also means the domination of man by man. By this,
man himself becomes an object of science; he realises that what he previously considered to be his
very own inner being, his immutable identity—in short: his soul—is of a contingent nature that can
be easily manipulated. Thus, he becomes responsible for himself, for his actions, his attitudes in
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a manner previously unknown. But, he has lost the authority (his identity or soul) that could take on
this responsibility. In this sociological sense, modernity means the dilemma of the empowerment of
man with his simultaneous incapacitation. Thus, in 1897 Durkheim coined the term ‘anomic suicide’
(Durkheim [1897] 2006). He uses the term to describe a new, contemporary form of suicide that he
sees as characteristically modern: free, flexible, and negotiable systems, such as modern societies are,
complicate the emotional integration of their citizens; this lack of integration sometimes results in
a final withdrawal from this system.
Recent research in literary history rereads Brandes’ ideas of a modern literature in the light of
this ambivalent modernity. It is claimed that Brandes had recognised this modernity in its core and
thus became the trendsetter and mouthpiece of a young generation of authors in Scandinavia who saw
themselves as radical, and whose most important representatives, such as August Strindberg, Victoria
Benedictsson, Jens Peter Jacobsen, and Henrik Ibsen, had portrayed modernity in its ambivalence
from the outset (e.g., Heitmann 2006, pp. 183–90). In the last 20 years, research has resumed Brandes’
four topics and identified them as focal points of the modernisation process with all its complexity
and ambivalence. In the context of Scandinavian studies, this is particularly evident in the research
on Henrik Ibsen: Gender, property, and social stratification issues were re-evaluated under the new
paradigm (e.g., Templeton 1997; Detering 1998; Rønning 2006; Moi 2006; Evans 2008; Heitmann 2012).
Therefore, the only aspect of Brandes’ catalogue of topics that still awaits classification in the
sociological paradigm of modernisation is the way in which contemporary literature dealt with
the role of religion. It is surprising that it is this topic that has been left unanalysed. The decline
of religion is fundamentally connected to modernisation in sociological theories: Many theorists
regard the detachment from a divine supernatural father and his supertemporal order as the trigger
for the processes that facilitated the development of personal responsibility, freedom, subjectivity,
and rationalism. Secularisation is thus the interface between the sociological paradigm of modernisation
and the catalogue of topics that Brandes designed for young writers around 1870. One must therefore
concede that the most important epistemic topic regarding modernity around 1900 has been neglected
so far by literary studies.
The literary texts of the epoch are not to blame. Again, Ibsen can serve as the most prominent
example. Religion plays a crucial role in many of his dramas: In Keiser og Galilæer (Emperor and Galilean;
1873), which, throughout his life, Ibsen himself considered to be his most important drama, he explicitly
negotiates Christianity and its apostasy from a historical-philosophical perspective; and his dramatic
œuvre ends in Når vi døde vågner (When We Dead Awaken; 1899) with the image of a deaconess making
the sign of the cross; this sign concludes a story about a sculptor who had become famous for his
sculpture ‘The Day of Resurrection’ (‘Oppstandelsens dag’). In addition, numerous representatives of
religion can be found in Ibsen’s character inventory, in Catilina (Catiline; 1850), Kjærlighedens Komedie
(Love’s Comedy; 1862), Kongs-emnerne (The Pretenders; 1864), Brand (Brand; 1866),1 Gengangere (Ghosts;
1881), Vildanden (The Wild Duck; 1884) or Rosmersholm (Rosmersholm; 1886). What is true for research on
Ibsen holds equally true for research on Scandinavian literature in general: So far, secularisation has
been neglected when it comes to describing literary modernity around 1900.
In the following, I intend to ask how this research desideratum can be approached: How can
secularisation in the texts of modernism around 1900 be analysed? Firstly, I will have to approach this
question conceptually: What do we mean when we talk about secularisation? For this, I will continue
with the sociological model I have just presented, but I will contradict it in one important respect.
My main hypothesis is that the mentioned authors were not lucid analysts of their time who portrayed
the process of secularisation going on around them in their dramas, novels, or short stories; instead,
they invested their own texts in the debate about how the relationship between religion and modernity
should be thought of in the first place. Therefore, I will treat secularisation neither as a historical
1 The theological aspects of Brand are addressed in the following: Cappelørn 2010; Gervin 2010; Tjønneland 2010.
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fact nor as a sociological concept but rather as a narrative scheme. In this narratological approach,
literature plays an important role not only in propagating but also in shaping what sociology later
termed ‘secularisation’. Treating secularisation as a narrative is such a fundamentally novel approach
that this article cannot provide more than a rough outline of a wide-ranging research project. This also
holds true for the second part of this paper. There, I will exemplify the change in approach using
a pivotal text of Nordic literary modernism, Ibsen’s Rosmersholm. My analysis has a purely illustrative
character and focuses exclusively on the way secularisation is narrated in the drama.
2. Secularisation in Crisis
In general, the term ‘secularisation’ denotes the shift from a sacrally legitimised society to
a secularly legitimised society. The conceptual cornerstones of the term already began to emerge during
the Prussian Kulturkampf in the middle of the 19th century (Borutta 2010) and were then discussed
after 1900 within sociology as a process of modernisation. Thus, ‘secular’ was synonymous with
‘modern’. Referring to Max Weber’s well-known metaphor: the process of modernisation was the
‘disenchantment of the world’. Therefore, secularisation is defined as a process in which religion
might still survive for a while, as a pre-modern relict within modernity, but will eventually disappear
for good.
This concept had an almost unassailable plausibility for the self-perception of European societies.
However, since the 2000s, the calls have increased for critical analyses of this idea of secularisation.
This is based on solid arguments. Ever since the attacks of 9/11, the self-evidence of the secularisation
theory has been disrupted in the public perception. The conviction that Europe and the world are on
their way to a privatisation of religion has turned into an outdated utopia. As a direct reaction to the
attacks in New York, Jürgen Habermas, for instance, coined the term of ‘post-secular society’ (Habermas
2001; Joas 2006). Furthermore, the attacks in Paris, London, Madrid, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Brussels,
Berlin, etc. probably do not permit a return to former certainty either. Today, the idea of religion’s
decline is therefore mere opium for the people. The fear of society’s Islamification, materialised
in Anders Breivik’s attacks in Oslo, or in the German Pegida-movement, shows the crisis of the
secularisation theory at the heart of Western societies.
In academic debates, one can discern two tendencies of critique towards the secularisation theorem:
On the one hand, it is said that the phase of secularisation has come to an end and that, dialectically,
the ‘return of the religious’ (Riesebrodt 2000) or a ‘desecularisation’ (Berger 1999) can be registered (Graf
2004, 2014; Pollack 2003, 2009). On the other hand, it is argued that the idea of secularisation is confirmed
in principle, but that it must be specified in its premises and differentiated locally and historically. Thus,
functional differentiation in the modernisation process, for instance, is criticised because of its supposed
or actual teleological or at least unilinear character (Joas 2012; Krech 2012; Pollack 2012). Secondly,
postcolonial studies and the awareness they inspired ensured that secularisation is no longer discussed
as an undisputable global process (Casanova 1994; Cady and Hurd 2010). And thirdly, historical
differentiation is long overdue: Obviously, the theory of a unilinear secularisation process does not
even hold true for Europe when looking at the historical sources (Gabriel et al. 2012; Osterhammel 2009).
3. Secularisation as Narrative Structure
Faced with the concept of secularisation in crisis, literary studies open up a fundamentally new
perspective by defining secularisation not as a historical process, but as a narrative structure. In recent
years, Albrecht Koschorke has worked intensively on surveying and developing narratological
approaches, which define man’s perception of the world as being essentially structured by
narrative—meaning approaches, which assume our understanding of the world as being mainly
processed by narration (Koschorke 2012). In this context, Koschorke has proposed the consideration of
‘secularisation’ and the idea of ‘religion’s return’ as two narrative structures of European Modernity
(Koschorke 2013). He defines the term narrative structure as an abstract model, which can be
regenerated in countless individual stories. Accordingly, a narrative structure can be understood as
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an interpretive framework, which can incorporate individual as well as collective experience, and which
conveys narrative significance to those experiences—i.e., turning them into a convincing story that
can be shared. By repeating and thus concretising the abstract pattern of the narrative structure,
the individual concrete stories reaffirm the plausibility of the structure. In return, on a superior
abstract level, the strengthened plausibility inspires the production of new specific individual stories.
In this light, ‘secularisation’ appears to be one of those narrative models that consistently helped to
generate and then stabilise the self-conception of Modern Europe. The fact that the plausibility of this
secular self-interpretation has been weakened in the last 20 years makes secularisation recognisable as
a narrative structure in the first place.
Therefore, the purpose of any narratological analysis must not be to criticise the content of the
secularisation theorem in one point or another, or to correct it historically. Instead, it is above all a matter
of understanding secularisation as a narrative structure and, furthermore, a matter of describing its
components and variations as well as assessing which of its qualities is responsible for its success and
durability. Koschorke identifies two main aspects. Firstly, secularisation as a narrative structure has
proven to be successful—meaning powerful—because it manages to incorporate opposing dispositions:
Secularisation can substantiate both progressive optimism and cultural pessimism. It can be celebrated
for the gained freedom and individualism, for the domination of the world through its rational
penetration, for the implementation of democratic equality as well as condemned for the metaphysical
disorientation, the materialistic desolation, and for the weakening of social bonding forces that it can
cause. This means that the narrative structure called secularisation was able to convince on a broad
scale precisely because it serves seemingly opposing positions of world interpretation and thus allows
dissent within mutual borders; it offers both its opponents and its proponents a plausible interpretation
on common ground.
The second characteristic of a prolific narrative structure that was analysed by Koschorke is
its ability to even incorporate facts that obviously defy the general plot (that is, the narrative about
religion’s decline). For example, the massive influx of people to Christian revival movements in the
19th century must not be recorded as a counter-argument, but can be seen as a reaction to the loss
of transcendence and can thus even be redefined as a confirmation of religion’s loss of relevance on
a broader social level: Piety movements as social niches in which metaphysical deficits are compensated.
The plot-pattern of the narrative structure thus includes potential alternatives that more or less ensure
the general structure’s immunity to challenges by empiricism.
Koschorke’s first outline of a narratological approach to the phenomenon of secularisation provides
a useful starting point. However, he is interested in a basic reconstruction of the narrative structure,
and not in its links to literary narration; his analysis remains general and is not substantiated by
the reconstruction of concrete narratives. This may be surprising because any narrative structure
undoubtedly finds its own form only over the course of an evolution that takes place in specific
individual narrations. The narrative structure only gradually finds its form; it develops within
the medium of countless individual narrations (in fiction, on stage, in film, in everyday stories,
in historiography, in journalistic texts, in political speeches . . . ). Within those specific narrations,
concepts, alternatives, and rejections are put to the test until one or more versions of the narrative
structure are canonised in the collective consciousness. Thus, my argumentation is based on the
assumption that both the academic conceptualisation within sociology and the fiction’s testing of
‘secularisation’ as a narrative structure take place on the same structural level during the founding
period around 1900. Both sides contribute to the configuration of the narrative structure by supporting
it or by opposing it; however, not in the dependence of literature on conceptual discussion, but in the
entanglement of both types of discourse. Thus, literary narrations of secularisation are not simply
subsequent traces of a historical process or literary implementations of an already established theorem
of secularisation. Instead, they are key players that participate in the shaping of the semantics of
‘secularisation’. Accordingly, the study of the relationship between secularisation and literature should
focus on the following questions:
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• How does literature narrate ‘secularisation’ around 1900?
• Which different voices and positions can be distinguished and which specific literary means of
cultural self-interpretation are being used?
• Which logics do literary texts use when establishing the narrative structure in order to make the
theorem credible, to disavow it, or to elaborate alternatives?
4. Rosmersholm’s Schizophrenic Secularism
Henrik Ibsen’s drama Rosmersholm from 1886 provides its audience with a great deal: a fierce
power struggle between tactical politicians, a love triangle in which two women compete for a man,
rejected sexual desire, incest, insanity, murder, visions of ghostly horses, the decline of an ancient
family and, finally, a double suicide in front of the breathtaking scenery of a Norwegian waterfall.
Nordic noir avant la lettre. The plot’s main trigger is based around the atheist coming-out of a former
parish priest: Johannes Rosmer, the last descendant of a venerable family which has produced officers,
clergymen, and senior civil servants for centuries and which has essentially determined the fate of the
region. This clergyman retires from the parish office and turns into a freethinker by reading works
from liberal authors. Therefore, it seems only natural to interpret this story about the loss of faith as
a secularisation drama.
Yet, although the focus of the story is on a renegade priest, research has yet to show any significant
interest in its analytical potential with regard to secularisation.2 This is also true for the most prominent
reader of Rosmersholm. In his essay Einige Charaktertypen aus der psychoanalytischen Arbeit (Some
Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytic Work) from 1916, Sigmund Freud detects a prefiguration
of the Oedipus complex in the drama’s second protagonist, Rebekka West. Surprisingly enough,
Freud is not interested in an analysis of religion, which is inherent in Johannes Rosmer’s apostate story,
although he himself had already recognised the Oedipus complex to be the origin of all religions in
Totem und Tabu (Totem and Taboo), three years before writing his essay on Rosmersholm. Thus, if at least
the logic behind Rebekka West’s behaviour is motivated by the Oedipus complex, it is obvious that the
liberation from religion experienced by Johannes Rosmer might also be potentially expressed in the
terminology of the Oedipal taboo of murder and incest.
Therefore, I will first—very briefly—reconstruct the sociological variant of secularisation in Ibsen’s
drama, which I have outlined above, and then continue Freud’s analysis of Rosmersholm. I hope this
will show that there is a second, an anthropological version of the secularisation narrative in the play,
and that this second version counters the first, i.e., the sociological one. This allows Ibsen to negotiate
two different versions of the narrative structure ‘secularisation’.
4.1. A Sociological Narrative of Secularisation
Rosmersholm develops its plot in two main lines that coincide at one particular point in the story.
The first of these plot lines is characterised by making clear references to the contemporary political
situation in Norway. The drama was published in 1886, two years after parliamentarism was introduced
to Norway (Tuchtenhagen 2009, pp. 108–9). Henceforth, the country was headed by a government
that consisted of elected politicians from the strongest party in parliament instead of by a collective of
civil servants who were appointed by the king. This new political system of party competition also
included the respective media that was able to form public opinion. Thus, Ibsen’s drama begins with
a visit from headmaster Kroll, a conservative politician, who intends to propose his friend Rosmer
as an editor and writer for a newly established conservative local newspaper; as the descendant of
an old and influential family, Rosmer could benefit the conservative party. The new paper is mainly
supposed to represent an ideological counterbalance to the liberal newspaper ‘Blinkfyret’ (Beacon).
2 Analytical approaches can be found for instance in (Durbach 1977).
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Even the editor of this very paper, Peder Mortensgård, appears at Rosmersholm shortly after Kroll’s
visit and tries to sway the head of the household.
This one aspect—parliamentarianism and the emergence of the free press as a means of political
opinion making in a liberal democracy—will suffice in order to illustrate that Ibsen outlines a social
context for his plot that complies with the same logics as the context which sociologists refer to as the
‘process of modernisation’ 30 years later—and which suggests that European societies had developed
from being traditionally stratified to modern and functionally structured social systems (Rønning
2006, pp. 209–28). Rosmer’s estrangement from God and his new conviction that people should and
must shape their lives by their own efforts correspond with this social development. As Rosmer puts
it: ‘There is no other’ power to help (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 244)—meaning no divine power to rely
on. Accordingly, Rosmer’s personal story of secularisation is embedded in the collective narrative of
secularisation I outlined in chapter 1.
The second main plot line focuses on the relationship between Rosmer and his wife, Beate, and on
his relationship with his wife’s companion, Rebekka West. Rebekka had joined the household of
the priest Johannes Rosmer long before the curtain rises—initially, in order to care for his sick wife,
Beate. Rebekka had been raised as a freethinker by her adoptive father, Dr. West, but conceals this fact.
Coming to Rosmersholm, she finds that Rosmer is receptive to liberal ideas. She provides him with
relevant literature and paves the way for him to atheism. Rosmer believes they are kindred spirits in
a platonic friendship. However, soon Rebekka would like to take the place of the lady of the house
in every respect. To achieve this, she cunningly leads the childless Beate to suicide by placing one
of the liberal texts read by Rosmer into Beate’s hands. The text argues that marriage is only justified
if descendants have been conceived. By hinting at the same time that she is pregnant by Rosmer,
Rebekka leads Beate to believe that she, Beate, has to quit the field in order to guarantee her husband’s
future happiness. When the curtain rises on the first act, Beate has been dead for one year. Rebekka
still lives at Rosmersholm.
This stable constellation collapses when the two plot lines cross each other: Rosmer feels compelled
by the political conflict between headmaster Kroll and the editor Mortensgård to admit his newly
won atheism. Kroll suspects Rebekka’s scheme, forcing Rebekka to confess. With the help of this
confession, Kroll manages to prevent Rosmer’s involvement with the liberals. Thus, the political
conflict culminates in Rosmer, a sincere person interested in freedom and liberality, being checkmated
by the power-seeker Kroll. The fact that Rosmer and Rebekka commit joint suicide at the end of the
last act by throwing themselves down the same waterfall Beate died in is an expression of their moral
breakdown according to this interpretation: Deprived of their mission in life, which was to convert
other humans to be freethinkers, they choose death, brokenhearted and hopeless.
In fact, this interpretation also fits in with a particular tradition within the reception of Ibsen’s
work. Dr. Stockmann, for instance, the protagonist in Ibsen’s En folkefiende (An Enemy of the People)
from 1882, finds himself in a similar situation (e.g., Rønning 2006, p. 212): He too, is betrayed by
political friends, yet, at the end of the drama, he decides to fight against all odds. Ibsen repeats this
set-up in Rosmersholm, but in a slightly different experimental arrangement, namely by using a weak
character who lacks the will to resist. One reason why Stockmann persists and Rosmer perishes can be
found easily within the argumentation developed so far. As a medical doctor, Stockmann is a scientist
and therefore a representative of secular modernity, whereas Rosmer is a former clergyman and thus
a representative of the religiously legitimised pre-modern era. His failure can be ascribed to his primal
and therefore still influential bonds to Christianity.3 He cannot get over his indirect responsibility for
the death of his wife and does not dare enter an emotionally and sexually satisfying relationship with
Rebekka—although such a relationship would be justified, even in the eyes of all other characters.
3 Cf. for instance: “Indem Ibsen Rosmer zum Pastor macht [ . . . ], erklärt er die christliche Askese, wie Nietzsche,
zum Ressentiment aus Impotenz bzw. Ohnmacht, und verbindet sie mit Gesetzesfetischismus und Überich-Hypertrophie.”
(Hiebel 1990, p. 137).
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Thus, the death of such a weak protagonist as Rosmer is to be understood as collateral damage in the
process of secular modernity. This very short sketch must suffice to illustrate what I would like to call
the sociologically motivated narration of secularisation embedded in Rosmersholm.
4.2. Secular Guilt
The second kind of secularisation, the anthropologically motivated narrative of secularisation,
becomes obvious if Rosmersholm is reconstructed based on the notion of guilt.4 By collecting the
statements about freedom and happiness made by the atheist Rosmer throughout the drama, only very
vague ideas about the subject will be found. Yet, one thing is obvious: Rosmer believes he will be
able to get rid of his feeling of guilt if he gets rid of religion. His ideal: ‘Quiet, happy innocence.’
(Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 270)—‘Happiness [ . . . ] is more than anything that serene, secure, happy freedom
from guilt.’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 279)—‘Any cause that is to win a lasting victory must have at its head
a happy and guiltless man.’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 282)—‘your happy innocence’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960,
p. 290)—‘Yes, innocence. Where happiness and contentment are found.’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 302).
The Norwegian original makes it even clearer by repeating the words skydfrihed/skyldfri again and
again: ‘Den stille, glade skyldfrihed.’(Ibsen 2009, p. 418)—‘Lykke [ . . . ], det er først og fremst den
stille, glade, trygge følelse af skyldfrihed.’ (Ibsen 2009, p. 436)—‘Den sag, som skal vinde frem til varig
sejr, —den må bæres af en glad og skyldfri mand.’ (Ibsen 2009, p. 440)—‘din glade skyldfrihed’ (Ibsen
2009, p. 456)—‘Skyldfriheden, ja. I den er lykken og glæden’ (Ibsen 2009, p. 482).
One could rightly assume that being free of guilt is the result of the abolition of a judging
divine entity. Within the play, this idea is tested but then dismissed with the example of sexuality:
When the other characters are told that Rosmer has lost his faith, everyone is convinced that he shares
not only board but also the bed with his companion Rebekka West. Whether it is his wife Beate,
headmaster Kroll, the editor Mortensgård, or the housekeeper Madam Helseth, they all interpret
Rosmer’s behaviour according to this logic: As soon as God’s punitive gaze disappears, the same
applies to the guilty conscience; a mind freed of religion is followed by free love. This logic would
fit into the interpretation presented above: Social secularisation and sexual liberation go hand in
hand. But, although everyone else might think this way, Rosmer does not. When he learns about
the accusations, he reacts indignantly: ‘Ah . . . ! So you don’t think there is any sense of virtue to be
found among freethinkers? Doesn’t it strike you they might have a natural instinct for morality?’
(Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 257). One might see these statements as the new phrasing of old Christian
austerity and thus Rosmer’s atheist asexual freedom as self-delusion. Yet, one has to take into account
that there is no reason for Rosmer to feel guilty—even if he is still influenced by a Christian denial of
drives and instincts. For there is nothing going on between him and Rebekka. And, where there is no
offence, there is no reason for remorse. Consequently, the guilty conscience that he thinks he can get
rid of as an atheist must have been caused by something other than the Christian fear of sexuality. So,
how does Rosmer define guilt after his lapse in faith? Which guilt is dissipated by his new lifestyle in
which sexual abstinence is obviously an essential element?
To answer these questions, it is helpful to consider Freud’s analysis of Rebekka West in his essay
Some Character-Types Met with in Psycho-Analytical Work, because Freud integrates sexuality into the
wider context of its social function. Freud shows very convincingly that Rebekka joins a constellation
corresponding to the Oedipal triangle by taking up her new employment at Rosmersholm: Being
a young woman herself, she encounters a married couple that, owing to their age and authority,
4 For my following argumentation, I owe thanks to the chapter ‘Totem, Tabu og Skuld. Om Rosmersholm (1886)’ in Atle
Kittang’s important book Ibsens Heroisme. Frå Brand til Når vi døde vågner (Kittang 2002). Kittang analyses Rosmersholm with
the help of Totem and Taboo, but (a) he is not interested in the religious-analytical potential of Ibsen’s drama and is therefore
not interested in the concept of secularisation. (b) He interprets the relationship between Freud’s theory and Ibsen’s drama
in a completely different way. According to him, Freud realises man’s anthropological basis and, with the help of Freud’s
terminology, he shows how even Ibsen represents this anthropology. Freud becomes his template to read Ibsen. I, however,
intend to emphasise that both Ibsen and Freud work on the same project.
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occupies the position of imaginary parents. Rebekka lusts for the parent of the opposite sex (meaning
the imaginary father Rosmer)—she herself talks about ‘wild, uncontrollable passion’ (Ibsen [1886]
1960, p. 299)—and therefore orchestrates the suicide of the parent belonging to the same sex (meaning
the imaginary mother Beate). The puzzling question challenged by Freud is, why does Rebekka first
rejoice at Rosmer’s marriage proposal and thus the fulfilment of her wishes, but vehemently rejects
his proposal the very next moment? How can that happen? Freud argues that later on in the story,
Rebekka is forced to recognise that her adoptive father, Dr. West, who became her first lover, is actually
also her biological father. This means she actually not only broke the taboo of killing by intriguing
against her symbolical mother Beate, but also broke the taboo of incest with her biological father,
Dr. West. When Rosmer asks her to marry him, she shies away from repeating this taboo of incest with
her symbolical father Rosmer.
I quote Freud: ‘Everything that happened to her at Rosmersholm, her falling in love with Rosmer
and her hostility to his wife, was from the first a consequence of the Oedipus complex—an inevitable
replica of her relations with her mother and Dr. West’ (Freud 2001b, p. 330). Ibsen’s poetic achievement
consists of illustrating the model that everyone experiences in an imaginary form during the period of
initial socialisation, which is at the age of three or four, through his particular set of characters. In other
words: The symbolical father (in Rebekka’s case it is of course the mother) is always more important
than the real one.5 In whatever way the biological father might behave himself, he becomes a surface
onto which the symbolical father is projected. This symbolical father figure claims the object of desire
for himself and therefore has to be eliminated by the son. The desire to kill causes the emergence
of a guilty conscience, which only then turns the individual into a human being who can put their
immediate desire aside for the sake of the community. That is exactly what happens when Rebekka
denies herself the rewards of her scheme. She describes it as follows: ‘It is the Rosmer philosophy of
life [ . . . ] that has infected my will. [ . . . ] Made it a slave to laws that had meant nothing to me before’
(Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 301). Here—in a guilty conscience—lies the link that opens Freud’s analysis of
a single character to anthropological speculation about the beginning of all religion in Totem and Taboo.
4.3. Ibsen’s Totem and Taboo
In accordance with the knowledge formations of his time, in his analytical essay on religion,
Freud assumes that totemism is the archetype of all religions. All other religions and even his own
period, which was critical of religion, should consequently be regarded as derivations of the one
cultural achievement that was generated by totemism. Consequently, Totem and Taboo resembles
the prolegomena of a narrative of secularisation which—and this is how one certainly can interpret
Freud—reaches its desired goal through psychoanalysis. Yet, in contrast to the sociological version
that was later canonised in Europe’s cultural consciousness, this particular narrative of secularisation
is not centred around a turning point where society’s sacral legitimisation turns into a secular one.
Rather, it is a narrative with an anagnorisis, a recognition. What is being recognised is that the process
that originally created religion makes every individual a social human being, that phylogenesis and
ontogenesis correlate—and that the core of religious ambivalence (‘the simultaneous existence of
love and hate towards the same object,’ Freud 2001a, p. 157) will not be overcome by turning away
from Christianity.
So, what constitutes this capacity for creating religions that totemism passed on to all following
religions? It is precisely in the sense of repentance. In the following, I will extensively quote from
Totem and Taboo’s best-known passage, in which Freud talks more comprehensively about history’s first
5 Hiebel states the same in his analysis of Rosmersholm (pp. 145–46): ‘Wieder ist die symbolische Vaterschaft wichtiger als die
biologische, reale.’ That is the reason why Ibsen introduces Rebekka’s adoption by Dr. West. Rebekka’s legal father, Gamvik,
never appears, ‘weil er nicht von der Aurole des Symbolischen umgeben war’.
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patricide.6 Its origin lies in the Darwinian primal horde which is governed by ‘a violent and jealous
father who keeps all the females for himself and drives away his sons as they grow up’ (Freud 2001a,
p. 141): “One day the brothers who had been driven out came together, killed and devoured their
father and so made an end of the patriarchal horde. [ . . . ] They hated their father, who presented such
a formidable obstacle to their craving for power and their sexual desires; but they loved and admired
him too. After they had got rid of him, [ . . . ] the affection which had all this time been pushed under
was bound to make itself felt. It did so in the form of remorse. A sense of guilt made its appearance
[ . . . ]. The dead father became stronger than the living one had been—[ . . . The brothers] revoked
their deed by forbidding the killing of the totem, the substitute for their father; and they renounced
its fruits by resigning their claim to the women who had now been set free. They thus created out of
their filial sense of guilt the two fundamental taboos of totemism, which for that very reason inevitably
corresponded to the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex” (Freud 2001a, pp. 141–43).
Thus, the various religions are to be regarded as versions of the deification of the father as
a reaction to an experienced guilt. Consequently, the basic feeling of guilt that religion is struggling
with, derives—according to Freud—only partially from illicit desire, and most certainly from the
experience of patricide which is being transferred from generation to generation—at least in its
imaginary form.
In Ibsen’s drama, the same concept of guilt can be found in statements made by the character
Rosmer. This becomes clear at a point in the story in which Rosmer is not talking about his own
guilt, but the feelings of guilt and shame that drove his wife Beate into suicide. In fact, he calls them
‘grundløse’/’unnecessary’: ‘the way she used to reproach herself quite unnecessarily’ (Ibsen [1886]
1960, p. 254—‘hendes grundløse, fortærende selvbebrejdelser’, Ibsen 2009, p. 387). What he means by
that is that ‘she had been told that she would never have any children’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 254). Thus,
Beate’s feeling of guilt stems from not being able to continue the Rosmers’ genealogical succession—a
genealogy that is not only omnipresent to the residents at Rosmersholm, but also to the theatre audience.
The first thing the audience sees as the curtain is rising is ‘the living-room at Rosmersholm’ in which
the eponymous genealogy has an overwhelming presence: ‘The walls are hung with past and recent
portraits of clergymen, officers and officials in their robes and uniforms’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 223).
Asbjørn Aarseth has called this stage scenery the most extreme example of an Ibsenesque effect of
claustrophobia (Aarseth 1999, p. 174). There is also a second aspect I would like to emphasise. Even if
the motif of infertility is well known as a punishment by God or Gods in the history of religion, it is
in fact the opposite that is emphasised by Rosmer in the statement above—i.e., that these feelings of
guilt are ‘grundløse’/’unnecessary’. It is Ibsen’s intention to demonstrate at various points in his plot
that it is precisely this carefree attitude toward filiation (meaning the continuation of genealogy) that
represents the crucial novelty of Rosmer’s atheist attitude. The freedom he experiences through his
apostasy is not related to suppressed sexuality; as I have shown earlier, he has little or no interest
in Eros—no matter which way one chooses for interpreting this fact; what actually turned out to
be a burden instead, was the duty to continue the family line. The text repeatedly emphasises that
atheism represents a betrayal of the fathers. From the various text passages, I will quote only one:
‘The descendant of these men here looking down on us . . . he’ll not escape so easily from what has
been handed down unbroken from generation to generation’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 284).7
6 Does this narrative simply represent a heuristic artifice that is supposed to make an unrepresentable circumstance plausible?
Many commentators on Freud’s work adopt this train of thought. Yet, Freud himself does not speak of an invention of
fiction but of a ‘lack of precision,’ ‘its abbreviation of the time factor and its compression of the whole subject-matter’ in his
narrative (Freud 2001a, pp. 142–43).
7 Another example is Rebekka’s speech ‘Oh, all these doubts, these fears, these scruples—they are just part of the family
tradition. The people here talk about the dead coming back in the form of charging white horses.’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 281).
And Rosmer himself formulates it as follows: ‘To me it seems I have a bounden duty to bring a little light and happiness into
those places where the Rosmers have spread gloom and oppression all these long years;’ to which Kroll answers sarcastically:
‘Yes, that would indeed be an undertaking worthy of the man who is the last of his line’ (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 259).
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For Rosmer, being childless is—in contrast to Beate—no reason for a guilty conscience. Instead,
the filiation that he is committed to represents the instance that causes his guilty conscience. The analogy
to Freud is unmistakable. Rosmer’s atheism proves to be something deeper than just a lapse of faith.
Like Freud, he focuses on religion itself and furthermore, just like Freud, he recognises religion’s
basic pattern to be the divine idealisation of a dead father figure who rules the son through a sense of
guilt. The freedom of guilt that Rosmer experiences due to atheism is thus indeed obtained through
sexual abstinence. Not because sexual desire in itself is forbidden, but because sexuality could
potentially continue the sequence of guilt. This succession can only be dissolved without a child.
Remaining childless does not constitute the cause for religious feeling of guilt (like for Beate), but as
the remedy against an anthropologically construed guilt. Rosmer, consequently, does not interpret
his asexual relationship to Rebekka as a sign of pathological loss of libido, but as the beginning of
a love that evades the system of guilt, because it is not meant to produce descendants. Rosmer refuses
to become a father himself. The imaginary unification with Rebekka8 through their joint suicide is
the ultimate manifestation of this refusal. According to Freud, the history of religion is a constant
variation of symbolical patricide and its remorsefully attempted annulment. Rosmer also recognises
this connection. His anagnorisis leads him to the only rebellion a son can make towards his father that
does not perpetuate the filiation of the father’s power and the son’s guilt. He refuses the identification
with his father by refusing to become a father himself.
Finally, there is one further aspect I would also like to address: Does Ibsen give his audience any
hints on how to normatively interpret Rosmersholm’s joint suicide? Should it be understood as a heroic
rebellion, an existential break with genealogy’s logics, with the original crime at the beginning of
humanity, which inevitably enslaves man in a regime of guilt? Or, is the crime instead found at the end
of the play? Is it possible that the joint suicide represents a crime against life itself, which is—despite (or
rather because of) its inevitable entanglement in guilt—still precious, worth living, and lovable? Ibsen
does not provide an answer. Of course not! But the question once again leads me back to Freud’s Totem
and Taboo, more accurately to one specific phrasing in the German original of the previously quoted
text passage, which contains a certain revelational potential. After the brothers of the primal horde
have eliminated their father, the following happens: ‘es entstand ein Schuldbewußtsein.’ (Freud [1913]
1999, p. 173—‘it appeared a sense of guilt’; in the words of the Standard Edition: ‘A sense of guilt
made its appearance’ (Freud 2001a, p. 143)). When dealing with an author who is as conscious of style
as Freud is, it must be noticed that he uses the syntactic expletive ‘es’ (Engl.: it)—a pronoun that does
not possess any semantic content. It is used, both in German and in English, because grammatically
correct sentences require a grammatical subject—as seen in the examples ‘it rains’ (‘es regnet’) or ‘it
seems’ (‘es scheint’). This expletive ‘it’ hides the fact that a sense of guilt does not appear out of thin air.
Instead, it needs a prerequisite; and this prerequisite is not the crime, but love and thus the obligation
towards loved ones. The deed only becomes a crime when this obligation is violated. Thus, even in
Freud’s narrative about the primal horde, culture does not really originate through crime, but through
love, which makes the deed a crime in the first place. Felix culpa!
5. Agents of Secularisation
I hope it has become clear that Rosmersholm presents two very different narratives of secularisation
and even confronts them with one another. One of them resembles the narrative which was later
canonised by sociology and thus became essential for the European perception of modernity. According
to this narrative, the transition into a modern society requires the dismissal of any finalised metaphysical
order—resulting in the ambivalent emotional simultaneity of freedom and alienation. It interprets the
joint suicide at the end of the drama as collateral damage brought about by the process of modernisation.
Nevertheless, if one approaches the issue of guilt, then one instead encounters a different model
8 (Ibsen [1886] 1960, p. 311): ‘For now we two are one.’
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of secularization—a model that admittedly manages to abolish institutionalised religion, but posits
religion’s origin, namely the sense of guilt, as an anthropological constant at the same time. In this
light, the suicide at the end of the drama turns into a refusal to transfer the sense of guilt that came
from the original crime to a new son.
Furthermore, I hope it has become clear that Freud’s psychoanalysis or the sociological idea of
modernisation is not simply regarded as my model for interpreting Ibsen in the same way shown
by previous research on Ibsen (e.g., Gerland 1998). Ibsen should not simply be understood as
a clear-sighted observer of his time who recognised the society’s process of secularisation and chose it
as a topic for his drama. Yet, at the same time, he must not be understood as a psychoanalyst avant la
letter, who already surmised religion’s secular ‘truth’, which was later made public by Freud. Instead,
he conceptualises different narratives of secularisation, he even confronts them with one another and
thus puts their plausibility to the test. In this way, like Freud and the founding fathers of sociology,
he becomes a powerful agent, who contributes to the narrative structure’s composition.
By embracing the challenge presented above of thinking of secularisation as a narrative structure,
the perspective on the literary material to be analysed changes fundamentally. The argument that
suggests that Strindberg, Ibsen, Jacobsen, Lagerlöf, etc. should be regarded as lucid interpreters of their
time, because they concur with the results of the sociological paradigm developed by Simmel, Weber,
Parsons, and others, represents an anachronism, because it disregards the fact that the mentioned
Scandinavian authors themselves were important agents of discourse formation. They lived before
there was a social consensus that defined history as a process of secularisation; in fact, they were
involved in shaping the idea of secularisation in the first place, in propagating it and in working on its
implementation. They did not react to the process of secularisation with their texts. Instead, they were
involved in the creation and shaping of the interpretative category ‘secularisation’. Therefore, their texts
should not (solely) be read as time-diagnostic sources but as performative-political investments.
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